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[L. A. No. 24895. In Bank. May 20,1958.]

PRENTISS MOORE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LEOPOLD
FELLNER et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Attorneys-Oompensation-Oontracta-For Oontingent Fees.
-Where an attorney and his clients entered into a contingent
fee contract that he was to receive for his legal services in
prosecuting one action and defending another a percentage of
any amount recovered from a third party and that, "at our
[the clients'] option," the attorney was to handle these eases
"in any of the higher courts," he could not successfully urge
that he was to handle an appeal only when the managing client
"exercised his option and notified him," in view of the fact that
the attorney had already, with such client's consent, handled
all steps proper to be performed up to that time relative to the

[1] Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 188 et seq.; Am.Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 163 et seq.
iricK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 102; [2] Attorneys,
§ 100; [3-6] Attorneys, § 92; [7,8] Attorneys, § 104; [9, 11J Attor.
neys, §ll9; [10] Abatement, §76; [12] Attorneys, §123.
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appeal, had notified the client of the charges for appeal transeripts, had been advised hy the client that these and additional costs would be paid, and had originally drafted the
eruployment eontraet between the parties, but that the words
"and, at our option, in any of the higher courts," and a provision that the elient was not to pay as costs the "fees to any
other attorneys you [plaintiff] may employ in these matters"
were inserted by the client in the eontract to make sure that,
if the ease were lost, he would have no obligation of any kind
to the attorney or anyone employed by the attorney for any
services in the matter, since it was inferribl~ that the attorney
did not understand the option provision to apply if, as actually
occurred, the ease was won in the trial court.
[2] Id.-Compensation-Contracts-ConstructioD.-Where an attoruey handling eertain litigation for his client pursuant to a
contingent fee contract obligating him to handle an appeal if
the client so eleeted twice wrote the client that if the client
wished to have his office handle the appeal "our fee would
be $2,000.00" in addition to any costs on appeal, the trial
court was warranted in interpreting such language as a demand by the attorney for payment of an additional fee and a
refusal to handle the appeal unless it was paid, and in concluding that the attorney's demand was wrongful and a breach
of his contract, and the client was not bound to make further
demands for performance by the attorney but was justified in
accepting his conduet as a termination of "your relationship
as our attorney" and in employing other counsel to handle the
appeal.
[3] Id.-CompensatioD-Effect of Discharge or Withdrawal From
Oase.-An attorney who wrongfully abandons or withdraws
from a case which he has contracted to handle, or who has
been discharged for cause by the client, may not recover compensation where the contract of employment was entire and
indivisible, but recovery for services rendered up to the date
of a discharge for cause may be allowed where the services
are regarded as divisible and one severable portion of them
has been fully performed.
[4&, fb] Id."""OompensatioD-Eft'ect·ilf Discharge.-Where an attorney and client at the time'of entering into a contingent fee
contract contemplated that the attorney's services should be
divisible into those rendered in superior court and on any
appeal from a superior court judgment, and the expression
"and, at our option, in any of the higher courts" was inserted
[3] See Cal..Tur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 194; Am..Tur., Attorneys
at Law, § 172.
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into the contract by the client who thus clearly indicated that
he wished to reserve the right to change counsel on appeal, if
the services were to be divisible for the client's benefit at his
option they should also be treated as divisible for the attorlillY'S benefit, if the interests of justice 80 require, especially
when the attorney had completed his services in connection
with the action he undertook to defend and had not failed to
perform any service which had become due for performance
up· to the time he was discharged for cause in making nnjustified demands for an additional fee for an appeal; the attorney
was entitled to reasonable compensation for services rendered
up to the time of termination of the attorney-client relationship, less any expense or other damage to which the client was
subjected by the attorney's defanlt.
[6] Id.-Oompensation-Efi'ect of Discharge.-An attorney discharged for sufficient cause is entitled to no more than the
reasonable value of his services rendered prior to his discharge, has no cause to complain and is fnlly protected by
payment of the reasonable value, and may not recover the fnII
contract amount (at least if such amount exceeded the reasonable value of the services.)
[8] Id.-Oompensation-Eifect of Discharge.-Where an attorney
is discharged without cause and the contract amount is less
than the reasonable value of the services, recovery is nevertheless limited to the fee fixed by the contract.
[7] Id.-Compensation-Contracts-For Oontingent Fees-Effect
of Discharge.-An attorney employed under a contingent fee
agreement who is wrongly discharged by his client is generally
entitled to the same amount of compensation and under the
same eontingency as if he had completed the services· contemplated.
[8] Id.-Oompensation-Oontracts-For Oontingent Fees-Effect
of Discharge.-If the recovery of an attorney wrongfully discharged 'Onder a contingent fee employment is limited to the
same contingency as if he had completed the services, then
one whose discharge has been for cause should be similarly
limited, i.e., even though the measure of his recovery is the
reasonable value of his services rather than (and not in excess
of) the full contract amount, he should not have judgment
until the contingency has occurred.
[9] Id.-Oompensation-Pleading-Defenses.-In an action to recover the reasonable value of services performed by an attorney under a contingent fee contract until discharged for cause,
the unfavored defense that the action was prematurely brought
becansefiled before occurrence .of the contingency is simply
matter of' abatement which must be pleaded in proper time
or it is waived.
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[10] Abatement-Proceedings-Waiver.-If the defense that the
action was prematurely brought docs not exist at the time
defendant seeks to raise it, there is no occasion to consider
whether it has been waived, since it may be disregarded.
[11) Attorneys ~ Compensation - Pleading - Defenses. - In an
action to' recover the reasonable value of services performed
by an attorney under a contingent fee contract, where defendant first raised the point of premature filing of the action by
objection to the introduction of evidence and by motion for
nonsuit when the case was on trial, and at a time when the
basis of the objection had been rendered nonexistent by the
client's actual recovery from a third party, the court was
justified in ruling against the plea.
(12) Id. - Compensation - Evidence-Value' of Bervices.-In an
action to recover the reasonable value of services performed
by an attorney under a contingent fee contract, .where plaintiff testified to the time he had spent, as well as that another
attorney, who was employed by him, had devoted some 450
hours to assisting him in preparation of the eases involved,
and where the client testified that most of his communications
and contacts with plaintiff's office were made with the other
attorney rather than with plaintiff personally, thus making it
clear that the client's employment of plaintiff contemplated
the participation of other attorneys in the services rendered
by plaintiff, although the cost of their services was by the
employment contract included in the fee to be paid plaintiff,
. the other attorney's services should be considered in determining the reasonable value of the services rendered by plaintiff to the client, and the trial court erred in its express
refusal to consider the time spent on the eases by the other
attorney.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Reversed with
directions.

..-

Action to recover attorney's fees on a contingency fee contract. Judgment for -plaintitI for less than amount sued for,
reversed with directions.
George Bouchard for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sidney Dorfman for Defendants and Appellants.
SCHAUER, J.-From a judgment for $12,825 in plaintitI's
favor in his action to recover the reasonable value of services
rendered by him as an attorney. both plaintitI and defendants
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appeal. Plaintiff contends that the award is inadequate,
and defendants, claiming breach of contract by plaintiff,l
urge that judgment should have been in their favor. We have
concluded that plaintiff has established a prevailing right.
and that the judgment should be reversed and the value of
the services redetermined.
The contract between the parties is evidenced by writings
in the form of letters. These, and other writings between the
parties, appear in the margin. The first is dated May 29,
1951, and constitutes the contract by which defendants (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Fellner) employed plaintiff
to represent them as attorney in certain litigation.2 By this
contract Moore was employed on a contingent fee basis to
prosecute an action by Fellner against one Steinbaum for
damages arising from breach of contract, and lor tke same
contingent lee to also defend Fellner in an action brought
'Defendants b;y their cross-complaint sought a declaration that the;y
owed plaintiff nothing.
a" Ma;y 29, 1951
"Mr. Prentiss Moore
Attorne;y at Law
453 South Spring Street
Los Angeles 13, California.
"Dear Mr. Moore:
"This will eonfirm our oral understanding that ;you are to represent
m;yself and m;y wife in the prosecution of a claim against Morris Stein·
baum arising from a breach of contract dated the fourteenth da;y of
April 1951 and also that ;you are to defend an action against us filed b;y
Irvin D. Berzon in the Superior Court, being Action No. 585893•
• , A. eompensation for ;your services in these matters we agree to pa;y
;you 20% of an;y amount recovered from Morris Steinbaum before trial
and 25% if the action proceeds to trial, including three da;ys before the
start 04! the trial. We agree to advance all neceB8ar;y eosts, including
eourt coats, depositions or an;y othcr costs incurred incident to the preparation of the ease such &8 appraisers' fees and expert witness' fees, but
not fees to any other attorneys you may employ in these matters. We
are depositing at this time with ;you .500.00 on account of such costs
and agree to make available any additional amounts nece88ar;y for these
purposes upon notice from you. However, all these advances will be
deducted from the amount to be recovered and the compensation of 20%
or 25% reap. will be based on the net amount.
"In addition to this we are depositing another .500.00 as an advance
paYIlIent which will be a retainer. However, this amonnt will be deducted
from your compensation of 20% or 25'10 resp.
"It is understood that this agreement covers our understanding to the
conclusion of these two eases in the Superior Court and, at our option,
in any of the higher courts.
"Yours ver;y trul;y
Leopold Fellner
Clara M. Fellner
,. Approved:
Prentiss Moore"
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against him by one Berzon for a broker's commission arising
out of the same transaction. Moore's compensation for the
dual services was to be 20 per cent of any amount recovered
from Steinbaum in a settlement before trial and 25 per cent
in ease of trial. -He was paid $500 on account of costs and an
additional $500 "as an advance payment which will be a
retainer." The two actions were consolidated for trial and
resulted in (1) a jUdgment of $104,500 in favor of Fellner
and against Steinbaum, and (2) a judgment of $20.000 against
FeUner and in favor of Berzon, which was settled for $17,500.
Steinbaum filed notice of appeal. Moore t('8tified that thereafter his office "went right on handling the ease on appeal"
as various matters arose needing attention, including arranging for a clerk's and a reporter's transcript. "authorization
for aU exhibits to be sent up to the Distriet Court of Appeal
and any and all other preparations which were incidental to
and short of the writing of the brief and the details going to
that point, " as weU as entering into a stipulation under which
$110,000 in United States Treasury Certificates were deposited
by Steinbaum in lieu of an undertaking on appeal.
On March 2, 1954, before appellant 8fe.inbau-m's brief had
been received, and when the services caned for by the contract, insofar as they had then accrued, had been faithfu.lly
performed, Moore wrote to Mr. and Mrs. Fellner stating that
if they wished him to handle th~ appeal his fee would be
$2,000 plus the necessary costs.' On March 3, 1954, Mr.
... Mareb 2, 1954
.. Mr. and Mrs. Leopold Fellner
9970 West Pieo Blvd.
Los Angeles, California
"Dear Mr. and Mrs. Fellner:
"The deposit of 1110,000.00 of Treasury Certificates haa been made
by the defendant Steinbaum and we have received notification that the
Clerk'lI Transcript has been prepared and the appeal iB proceeding.
•• The reason for writing you at thJ.- time is to advise you that in 0111'
opinion the respondents' briefs and tbe costs on appeal will approximate
1500.00, of course, depending npon the It'JIgtb of our reply to tbe appellant's brief. We IIbould like to have you ad'l"ise as BOon &8 pOllllible all to
wbetber you desire this otllce to handle the appeal and if 110, our fee wil1
be .2,000.00, plu8 the necessary costs above outlined. Sbould you desire
any other firm to bandle the appeal, kindly notify us a8 BOon &8 pouible
and I am enclosing the only current obligation which iB now due, the
cost of the balance of the Reporter's Transcript in the amount of .16.00•
•• Respectfully,
Moore, Webster, Lindelof & Bughes
Prentill8 Moore
J
Prentiss Moore"

)
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Fellner replied," referring to the provision of the employment
contract2 reading as follows: "It is understood that this
agreement covers our understanding to the conclusion of
these two cases in the Superior Court and, at our option, in
any of the higher courts." Moore replied on March 10,' and
.. , March B, 19M
"Mr. Prentiss Moore
.17 South Hill Street
Los Angeles'lB, Calif.
"Dear Mr. Moore:
"I have reeeived your letter of Mareb 2nd and I have paid the bill of
$16.00 to the Reporter.
"I assume that you overlooked that part of our agreement whieb
specifieally stipulates that the agreed fees cover and include all the
appeals. I would appreciate it if you' would let me know your eonsidered
opinion about this IIl!'tter.
"Whatever the court costs will be we will make payments npon receipt
of the bills to the court Reporter as in the past.
., Cordially 70urs,
Leopold Fellner"

"Mr. Leopold Fellner
9970 West Pico Blvd.
Los Angeles, California

"'March 10,19M

"Dear Mr. Fellner:
"I am at a IOS9 to understand the position taken in your letter of
Mareb Brd inasmuch as during the negotiations which we had leading to
the making of our agreement with respect to the fees of this oftiee, it
wss clearly understood to be through proceedings in the Superior Court.
"As 70U may recall. 10U pointed out at the time you corrected the
letter whieb we had prepared for 70ur signature on May 25, 1951,
(altered by your letter of May 29. 19!il) that what you wanted clearly
understood was, regardle&ll of the outcome of the proceedings in the
Superior Court, 70U wanted to have the opportunity of ebOO8ing otber
eounsel if you _11' fit after the tennination of the Htigation in the
Superior Court.
.
"As you well know, we at DO time ever made any agreement that
presupposed the carrying of 10ur litigation beyond the Superior Court
UIIder the contingent fee arrangement of twenty-five per cent of the
reeover,. from Morris Steinbaum any more than it would be assumed
that we would earr,. an appeal in the event the litigation was lost in the
trisl court, through the state appellate courts and possibly the Supreme
Cour of the United States, without any compensation. Your only'
request was that 10U be allowed the opportunity of changing COUDAeI
after the determination of the proceedings in the trial court.
"In accordance with that understanding we wrote you on the 2nd,
due to the imminence of the appeal, to advise 10U that it 11'&8 still satill'
factory with this office for you to eboose any counllel for the purpose of
defending your rights on appeal; that IIhould you eare to have this omce
represent you in the appeal, that our fee would be 12,000.00 in addition
to any costs on appeal.
"As you may recall, you asked for and were given the balance of
costs that had been deposited in eonne('tion with the trial litigation after
the judgment hRd been entered. We received notice that the next amount

)
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on March 13 Fellner wrote Moore· again ea11ing attention to
the above-quoted contract provision and declaring, among
iDe is t25.80, payable to the County Clerk for preparation of the Clerk'a
Tl1UllICript on Appeal, 'Which mUBt be paid b7 Mareh Uth •
•• Bespectfully,
Moore, Webster, Lindelof " Bqhea
Prentiu Moore"
-"Kareb 18,19M
UMe8IIrs. Moore, Webster, Lindelof" Bqhes
417 South BilI Street
Loa Angeles 18, California
"Dear Mr. Moore:
"I have received ;your letter of March 10th. The reading of it 1faI
quite a Ihoeking experience to UI. Aa I outlined in my letter of Karch
8rd we were ·confident that ;you overlooked the terms of our qreement
and that ;your considered opinion, based on the terms of the contract,
would not differ from ours.
"Your atatements and implicatioUi are falae and iesigned to diItort
the issues. We never considered and negotiated about anything e1l8 hut
a contingenc;y fee wbieb would cover the litigation to the final latisfamon of our claim, and, if nee8ssar;y, at our option, any litigation to
the higbest court. Tbe purpose of a contingency arrangement had no
other purpose for UI but to assure ourselves against payments of attor·
ne;ys' fees whieb would be difticult for UI to handle. We emphasised this
in our agreement by laying: • of any amount recovered from Morris
Steinbaum. • Aa if this would not be enougb, we emphasized it again:
'it is understood that this agreement covers our understanding to the
conclusion of th818 two cases in the Superior Court and, at our option,
in any of the higbest courts.'
•• I do not understand wbat bearing our rigbt to ehange counsel would
have on this matter• .till I wish to atate the facts as they are. When
I asked you during our negotiations wbat the purpose of a retainer fee
was, when there is a contingency fee arrangement, yOU explained that
this was just lomething like earnest money in cue I would change counsel and there was never any suggestion on m;y part that I would eonsider
this pOlsibUit;y.
"You used the fact that I picked up the balanee of our deposit with
70U to diItort the issues. You know well what happened. When we had to
pay, without prior notice from yo~ .over t1,500 to the Court Reporter
and Appraiser, I told ;yOU that it was ver;y difticult for UI to raile thil
money on sueb a Ihort notice. Then I suggested that, as we were paying
tbe bills direct to the. Court Reporter, and other expenseB, it would not
lerve any purpose to have a deposit 17ing around in your oflice.
"We eannot lee any pOlBibility of a misunderstanding Oil 70ur part.
We cannot look at it in aD7 otber way but that 70U tried to take advantage of our :Position. This, of couree, has disrupted and destroyed an;y
relatjonsbip of confidence between UI. We must COl1sider that you bave
deliberately breaebed our agreement of Ma;y 29th, 1951. For that reason
1) we consider 70ur relationsbip as our attorne;y terminated b;y ;your
eonduct and we will leek other eounsel to represent UI in this litigation.
2) Tbe agreement of Ma;y 29th, 1951, between us has been terminated
by 70U and we must accept tbe termination of the contract and aet
aecordingl;y.
• 'OUf new counsel will contact ;you as SOOI1 as possible. He will conduct
any necessar;y negotiations with ;you ..lour behalf.
I I Yours ver;y trIll;y,
Leopold Fellner"
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other things, that "We must consider that you have deliberately breached our agreement of May 29, 1951. For that
reason 1) we consider your relationship as our attorney terminated • . . and will seek other counsel to represent us in
this litigation." Moore replied on March 19.1 Moore declined
to sign a substitution of attorneys and Fellner obtained an
order in the District Court of Appeal substituting other counsel on the appeal. Thereafter on June 30, 1954, Moore again
wrote to Fellner.8 The judgment against Steinbaum was
affirmed on appeal (Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955), 132 Cal.
App.2d 509 [282 P.2d 584]), and Fellner was paid some
$117,000 (which included interest) thereunder. The substituted counsel charged Fellner $1,000 for handling the appeal.
9"Ka!eh 19, 19M
"Mr. Leopold Fellner
9970 West Pico Blvd.
LoJ Angeles, California
"Dear Mr. Fellner:
"I have ,"our letter of March 13th. Of cou.rae, most of the statementa
,.ou make in ;your letter &II to facti are 11lIfounded. There is DO attempt
b,. me to breaeh our agreement of Ma,. 29th as ,.ou state. In writing ;you
I was mere1;y endeavoring to clarif,. m,. position 10 far &II the appeal of
,.our ease was concerned.
•• From ;your correspondence, I can onl;y conclude that ,"ou are exercising ;your option to emplo,. other counsel for the appeal, and that the fee
arrangement iB still in effect. According, I will expect pa,.ment of twent,.five per cent of all funds received from Morris Steinbaum.

• 'Beapeetlulq,
PrentiBs Moore"
"'.Tue 80, 19M

"Mr. and Mrs. Leopold Fellner
9970 West Pico Blvd.
Loa Angeles, California
"Dear Mr. and Mrs. Fellner:
"B,. ;your action in eeeu.ring &1l order of court Jue 22, 19M, nbetituting Sidne,. Dorfman as ,"our attorne,. in plaee of m,.eelf in the ease
of Fellner VI. Bteinbaum, ;you have made it impOBlible for .me to complete the performance of m,. part of an,. agreement that we had
regarding ,"our representation in that eBee. Your diBeharge of me was
without cauae and was wrongful I hereb,. elect to treat the contract
of my employment as ;your attorney in that matter as rescinded and will
shortly commence an aetion for the determination of the reasonable
value of my aerviees to date. In thiB action ,"ou will receive credit for the
$500.00 retainer that ;you gave me at the time the representation first

arose.

"I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Sidne,. Dorfman for his
information.
"Yours trul;y,
PrentiBs Moore
00: Mr. Sidney Dorfman
10332 La Grange Avenue
LoJ Angeles 25
California' ,

Hay 1958]
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From the writings above listed and other evidence the trial
court found, so far as here material, as follows: plaintiff
Moore demanded from Fellner $2,000 as additional compensation for handling the appeal and refused, after demand by
Fellner, to handle the appeal unless he was paid the $2,000;
he was discharged by Fellner, and "it is not true that the
defendants discharged plaintiff without cause or justification"; on June 30, 1954, "plaintiff in writing rescinded" his
contract with defendants; "at the time of his discharge
plaintiff had substantially performed his part of the agreement
with defendants, and the services rendered by him were of
value to the defendants"; the "reasonable value of the professional services rendered ... by plaintiff ... to the time he was
discharged is the sum of $13,325.00" of which he had been
paid on account the sum of $500. As conclusions of law the
court declared that plaintiff, under the terms of his contract
with Fellner, was "required to represent" the latter on the
appeal from the judgment against Steinbaum without further
charge; that plaintiff's demand for an additional fee was
wrongful and a breach of his contract; but that plaintiff is
entitled to recover from Fellner the reasonable value of his
services, less the $500 paid on account. Judgment was thereupon entered in plaintiff's favor for $12,825, and these appeals
by both parties followed.
As ground for reversal, defendants contend that plaintiff
was required to represent them on the Steinbaum appeal
without further compensation, that he wrongfully demanded
payment of an additional fee of $2,000 and refused to render
further services on the appeal unless paid that sum, and that
he thereby breached the employment contract and is therefore
entitled to no compensation.
[1] Plaintiff does not dispute that he was obligated to
handle the appeal if Fellner so requested, and seems not now
to contend that he was entitled to demand an additional fee
for so doing. Plaintiff polis, however, urge that he was to
"do so [only] when theCclient exercised his option and notified
him," and that the option was never exercised. This contention, on the record before us, is without substantial merit.
Previous to his letter of March 2, 1954, to Fellner, plaintiff
had already, with Fellner's consent, handled all steps proper
to be performed up to that time relative to the appeal, had
notified Fellner of the charges for appeal transcripts, and
had been advised by Fellner that these and additional costs
would be paid. He had not written the respondent's brief, but

· MOORE !I. FELLNER

.:-·.·.{50C.2d

.appellant's opening brief had not yet been received. It further appears from plaintiff's testimony that he had originally
drafted the employment contract between the parties but
that the words "and, at our option, in any of the higher
courts," as well as the provision that Fellner was not to pay
as costs the "fees to any other attorneys you [plaintiff] llIay
employ in these matters," were inserted by Fellner in the
contract; and, further, that "one of the reasons for . . .
[Fellner's insertions was] to make sure that if the case were
lost, he would have no obligation of any kind to me or
anyone employed by me for any services rendered in this
matter ..• and ... would have the right to . . . have somebody else prosecute the appeal or take whatever action they
cared to after the case might be lost in the Superior Court."
It is thus inferrible that Moore did not understand the option
provision to apply if, as actually occurred, the case was won
in the trial court. Moreover, although Fellner testified that
. following the trial he did not talk to Moore "specifically"
about "these appeal problems," he did testify to "two or
three" personal conversations and a "few" telephone conversations concerning their progress with Moore's office
associate, Mr. Lindelof, with whom Moore had previously
directed that Fellner "always should talk." Moore himself
testified freely that "whatever was done by my office I take
the full responsibility for it and it is not that of either Mr.
Lindelof or anyone else in the office other than my own and
done under my authority and by my delegation." Thus the
trial court could infer that Moore was fully aware, prior to
his letter of March 2, that Fellner expected and intended that
Moore would handle the appeal, and that no formal notice of
exercise by Fellner of his option was required.
[2] Moore, although not contending that he was entitled
to an additional fee of $2,000, urges that after all he did not
demand an additional fee for the appeal or make "the fee
itself a condition precedent to the attorney going ahead with
the appeal." The language he used in the letter of March 2,
was: "We should like to have you advise as soon as possible
as to whether you desire this office to handle the appeal and
if 80, our fee will be $2,000.00, plus the necessary costs above
outlined." In his letter of March 10 to Fellner, Moore referred again to his statement that "should you care to have
this office represent you in the appeal, . . . our fee would be
$2,000.00 in addition to any costs on appeal." It is apparent
that the trial court was warranted in interpreting this lan-

)
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guage as a demand by Moore for payment of an additional fee
and a refusal to handle the appeal Jlnless it was paid, and in
concluding that plaintiff's demand was "wrongful and a
breach of his contract." It follows that Fellner was not
bound to make further demands for performance by Moore
but was justified in accepting his conduct as. a termination of
"your relationship as our attorney"6 and in employing other
counsel to handle the appeal.
However, it does not follow that Moore's right to compensation for services already performed was thereby forfeited.
[3] Although it has been held that an attorney who wrongfully abandons or withdraws from a case which he has contracted to handle, ·or has been discharged for cause by the
client, . may not recover compensation (see 7 C.J.S. 1031,
§ 169, subd. a(3), b.; 5 Am.Jur. 363, § 171), this approach
appears to have grown in part from situations in which the
contract of employment was considered to be entire and
indivisible. (See Cahill V. Baird (1902), 7 Cal.Unrep. 61 [70
P. 1061]; 7 C.J.S. 943, § 110; c/o Oliver v. Campbell (1954),
43 Cal.2d 298, 304 [3] [273 P.2d 15].) On the other hand
recovery for services rendered up to the date of a discharge for
cause has likewise been upheld where the agreed compensation was payable to the attorney in equal monthly payments;
i.e., where the services. seemingly were regarded by the court
as divisible. (See Moser V. Western Harness Racing .Assn.
(1948),89 Ca1.App.2d 1, 3, 13-14 [200 P.2d 7] ; c/o Salopek v.
Schoeman·n (1942),20 Ca1.2d 150 [124 P.2d 21], affirming, on
appeal 0/ assignee 0/ attorney discharged for cause, judgment
of $300 as reasonable value of his services, claimed by him .to
be an inadequate award.)
[4&] In the present case it appears that the parties at
the time of entering into the employment contract contemplated that the attorney's services should be divisible into
those rendered (1) in the 'superior court, and (2) on any
appeal from a superior,oourt judgment. The expression" and,
at our option, in any of the higher courts," was inserted into
the contract by the client, Fellner, who thus clearly indicated
that he wished to reserve the right to change counsel on
appeal. If services are to be divisible for the benefit of the
client, at his option, then it follows that they may also be
treated as divisible for the benefit of the attorney, if the
interests of justice so require. Especially is this true in this
case where plaintiff had completed ·his services in connection
with defending Fellner in the Berzon action and had net
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fGiled 10 perform IJny ,ervicB which 1uul become due for performa.nce up to the time of the disagreement. Fellner did
not await any actual failure to perform. He had a right to,
and he did, elect to treat the contract as ended by reason of
Moore's unjustified demands. Thus, at least in effect, he discharged Moore for cause. No reason whatsoever appears why
the court cannot fully protect Fellner against any loss on
account of plaintiff's default in relation to his obligations on
appeal and at the same time preclude the former's seeming
unjust enrichment, by awarding reasonable compensation to
plaintiff for his services in the Berzon action and in the
Steinbaum action up to the time of breach. Consequently,
under the above holdings the attorney is entitled to reasonable
compensation for services already rendered up to the time of
termination of his attorney-client relationship with Fellner,
less any expense or other damage to which the client was
subjected by the default of Moore.
(5] As declared in 8aJope'k v. 8choemann (1942), auprIJ,
20 Oa1.2d 150, 153 [1],155 [3], "if an attorney is discharged
for sufficient cause he is entitled to no more than the reasonable value 'Of his services rendered prior to his discharge, " has
"no cause to complain and is fully protected by payment of
the reasonable value," and may not recover the full contract
amount (at least if such amount exceeds the reasonable value
of the services). (8] On the other hand in iL case in which
the discharge appears to have been without cause, it has
been held that where the contract amount is less than the
reasonable value of the services, recovery is nevertheless limited to the fee fixed by the contract. (See OUtJer v. CIJmpbell
(1954), aupra., 430al.2d 298, 306 [9].) [4b] In the present
.case plaintiff BOught and was awarded judgment based on
reasonable value.- Under the rules above stated his recovery
must not, of course, exceed the fee fixed by the employment
contract, less expenses to which the client (defendant) was
put by the change of counsel.
Defendants urge, however, that even if plaintiff is entitled
to judgment, his action was premature because filed before
final disposition of the Steinbaum case on appeal and recovery by Fellner from Steinbaum. This action was filed December 1, 1954; the Steinbaum judgment was affirmed on
appeal on April 25,,1955 (Fell1ler v. 8teinbaum (1955), I1lpra,
132 Oal.App.2d 509), and hearing by the Supreme Oourt
ext maT be 1I0ted that plailltilf by his pleac1illga haa BOught reeover;y
0IIl;y ill fIIOnf_ ",eruit, and haa 1I0t ned for the COIltract fee.
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was denied on June 23, 1955. It appears that before this
action went to trial on May 22, 1956, Fellner had collected
from Steinbaum. ['1] In Jones v. Marlin (1953),41 Ca1.2d
23, 27 [256 P.2d 905], the rule is stated that "An attorney
employed under a contingent fee agreement who is wrongfully discharged by his client, is generally entitled to the
same amount of compensation and under tke same contingency
as if he had completed the services contemplated. [Citations.]" (Italics added.) [8] If the recovery of an attorney wrongfully discharged under a contingent fee employment is limited to the same contingency as if he had completed the services, then one whose discharge has been for
cause should be similarly limited; i.e., even though the measure of his recovery is the reasonable value of his services rather
than (and not in excess of) the full contract amount, he
should not have judgment until the contingency has 00curred-here, recovery by Fellner from Steinbaum.
[9] However, the unfavored defense that the action was prematurely brought is simply matter of abatement which must
be pleaded in proper time or it is waived. [10] Further, if
the defense has ceased to exist at the time defendant seeks
to raise it, there is no occasion to consider whether it has been
waiv~d, as it may be disregarded. (Radar v. Rogers (1957),
49 Cal. 243, 250 [6, 7] [317 P.2d 17].) [11] In the present case defendant 1lrst raised the point of premature 1lling
of the action by an objection to the introduction of evidence
and by motion for nonsuit when the case was on trial and
at a time when the basis of the objection had been rendered
nonexistent by Fellner's actual recovery from Steinbaum.
Under such circumstances the court was justi1ied in ruling
against the plea.
Plaintiff on his part contends (1) that the valuationplaeed
by the trial court on his services is inadequate and not supported by the evidence, and (2) that the court erred in
refusing to consider or place any value upon the services of
plaintiff's office associate; Lindelof.
[12] Plaintiff testified that in his opinion the reasonable
value of services rendered by him and Lindelof to Fellner was
not less than $40,000. Other attorneys testifying as experts
gave valuations of $25,000 and of $10,000. Plaintiff further
testified as to the time he himself had spent on the Fellner
matters, as well as that Lindelof, who was employed by
plaintiff, had devoted some 450 hours to assisting him in
preparation of the cases. Fellner likewise testified that most
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of his communications and contacts with plaintiff's office were
made with Lindelof rather than with plaintiff personally, thus
making it clear that Fellner's employment of plaintiff contemplated the participation of other attorneys in the services
rendered by plaintiff, although the cost of their services was
by the employment contract included in the fee to be paid
to plaintiff, rather than being charged as additional or separately itemized costs to Fellner. It is thus apparent that
Lindelof's services were included in those provided by Moore
and should be considered in determining the reasonable value
of the services rendered by plaintiff to Fellner, and that the
trial court erred in its express refusal to consider the time
spent on the Fellner cases by Lindelof. Under such circumstances the matter should be remanded for a new determination in the trial court. (Arenson v. National Auto. &7 Cas.
[ns. Co. (1957),48 Ca1.2d 528,540 [8] [310 P.2d 961].)
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views hereinabove
expressed, each party to bear his or their own respective costs
on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. For the reasons stated by Mr.
Presiding Justice Shinn in the opinion prepared by him for
the District Court of Appeal in Moore v. Fellner, (Cal.App.)
318 P .2d 526, I would reverse the judgment with instructions
to the trial court to vacate the present judgment, make new
conclusions of law, and enter judgment on the findings and
conclusions in favor of defendants Fellner.
Spence, J., concurred.
The petition of defendants and appellants for a rehearing
was denied June 17, 1958. Traynor, J., and Spence, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

